Information technology and the world economy by Dale W. Jorgenson & Khuong Vu
  1
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY∗  
                     by 
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1.  Introduction. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of investment in 
information technology (IT) equipment and software on the recent resurgence 
in world economic growth. The crucial role of IT investment in the growth of 
the U.S. economy has been thoroughly documented and widely discussed.
1 
Jorgenson (2001) has shown that the remarkable behavior of IT prices is the 
key to understanding the resurgence of American economic growth. This 
behavior can be traced to developments in semiconductor technology that are 
widely understood by technologists and economists.  
Jorgenson (2003) has shown that the growth of IT investment jumped to 
double-digit levels after 1995 in all the G7 economies – Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United 
States.
2 These economies account for nearly half of world output and a much 
larger share of world IT investment. The surge of IT investment after 1995 
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resulted from a sharp acceleration in the rate of decline of prices of IT 
equipment and software. Jorgenson (2001) has traced this to a drastic 
shortening of the product cycle for semiconductors from three years to two 
years, beginning in 1995. 
In Section 2 we describe the growth of the world economy, seven 
economic regions, and fourteen major economies given in Table 1 during the 
period 1989-2003.
3 The world economy is divided among the G7 and Non-G7 
industrialized economies, Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The fourteen major economies include the G7 economies listed above 
and the developing and transition economies of Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and South Korea.  
We have sub-divided the period in 1995 in order to focus on the 
response of IT investment to the accelerated decline in IT prices. As shown 
in Table 1, world economic growth has undergone a powerful revival since 
1995. The per capita growth rate jumped nearly a full percentage point from 
2.50 percent during 1989-1995 to 3.45 percent in 1995-2003. We can underline 
the significance of this difference by pointing out that per capita growth 
of 3.45 percent doubles world output per capita in a little over two 
decades, while slower growth of 2.50 percent doubles per capita output in 
slightly less than three decades.  
In Section 3 we allocate the growth of world output between input 
growth and productivity. Our most astonishing finding is that input growth 
greatly predominated! Productivity growth contributed only one-fifth of the 
total during 1989-1995, while input growth accounted for almost four-fifths. 
Similarly, input growth contributed more than seventy percent of growth 
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after 1995, while productivity accounted for less than thirty percent. The 
only important departure from this world-wide trend is the Asian Miracle 
before 1995, when the rate of economic growth in Developing Asia far 
outstripped the rest of the world and productivity growth predominated.  
In Section 3 we distribute the growth of input per capita between 
investments in tangible assets, especially IT equipment and software, and 
investments in human capital. The world economy, all seven regions, and the 
fourteen major economies, except Indonesia and Mexico, experienced a surge 
in investment in IT after 1995. The soaring level of U.S. IT investment 
after 1995 was paralleled by jumps in IT investment throughout the 
industrialized world.  The contributions of IT investment in Developing 
Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa more than doubled after 1995, beginning from much lower 
levels. By far the most dramatic increase took place in Developing Asia.  
In Section 4 we present levels of output per capita, input per capita 
and productivity for the world economy, the seven economic regions, and the 
fourteen major economies. We find that differences in per capita output 
levels are primarily explained by differences in per capita input, rather 
than variations in productivity. Taking U.S. output per capita in 2000 as 
100.0, world output per capita was a relatively modest 23.9 in 2003. Using 
similar scales for input and productivity, world input per capita in 2003 
was a substantial 42.4 and world productivity a robust 56.3. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
                   2. World Economic Growth, 1989-2003.  
In order to set the stage for analyzing the impact of IT investment on 
the growth of the world economy, we first consider the shares of world 
product and growth for each of the seven regions and the fourteen major 
economies presented in Table 1. Following Jorgenson (2001), we have chosen 
GDP as a measure of output. We employ the Penn World Table, generated by   4
Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten (2002), as the primary data 
source on GDP and purchasing power parities for economies outside the G7 and 
the European Union, as it existed prior to enlargement in May 2004.
4  
We have revised and updated the U.S. data presented by Jorgenson 
(2001) through 2003. Comparable data for Canada have been constructed by 
Statistics Canada.
5 Data for France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. and the 
economies of the European Union before enlargement have been developed for 
the European Commission by Bart van Ark, et al.
6 Finally, data for Japan 
have been assembled by Jorgenson and Kazuyuki Motohashi for the Research 
Institute on Economy, Trade, and Industry.
7 We have linked these data by 
means of the OECD’s purchasing power parities for 1999.
8 
The G7 economies accounted for slightly under half of world product 
from 1989-2003. The per capita growth rates of these economies - 2.18 
percent before 1995 and 2.56 percent afterward - were considerably below 
world growth rates. The growth acceleration of 0.60 percent for the G7 
economies lagged behind the jump in world economic growth. The G7 shares in 
world growth were 41.3 percent during 1989-1995 and 33.6 percent in 1995-
2003, well below the G7 shares in world product of 47.4 percent and 45.3 
percent, respectively.  
During 1995-2003 the U.S. accounted for 21.8 percent of world product 
and 48.2 percent of G7 output. After 1995 Japan fell from its ranking as the 
world’s second largest economy to third largest after China. Germany dropped 
from fourth place before 1995, following the U.S., China, and Japan, to 
fifth place during 1995-2003, ranking behind India as well. Japan remained 
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the second largest of the G7 economies, while Germany retained its position 
as the leading European economy. France, Italy and the U.K. were similar in 
size, but less than half the size of Japan. Canada was the smallest of the 
G7 economies.  
The U.S. growth rate jumped from 2.43 percent during 1989-1995 to 3.56 
percent in 1995-2003. The period 1995-2003 included the shallow U.S. 
recession of 2001 and the ensuing recovery, as well as the IT-generated 
investment boom of the last half of the 1990’s. The U.S. accounted for more 
than half of G7 growth before 1995 and more than two-thirds afterward. The 
U.S. share in world growth fell below its share in world product before 
1995, but rose above the U.S. product share after 1995. By contrast Japan’s 
share in world economic growth before 1995 exceeded its share in world 
product, but fell short of the product share after 1995. The remaining G7 
economies had lower shares of world growth than world product before and 
after 1995.  
The 16 economies of Developing Asia generated slightly more than a 
fifth of world output before 1995 and more than a quarter afterward. The 
burgeoning economies of China and India accounted for more than 60 percent 
of Asian output in both periods.
9 The economies of Developing Asia grew at 
7.35 percent before 1995 and 5.62 percent afterward. These economies were 
responsible for an astounding 61 percent of world growth during 1989-1995! 
Slightly less than half of this took place in China, while a little less 
than a third occurred in India. Developing Asia’s share in world growth 
declined to 43 percent during 1995-2003, remaining well above the region’s 
share of 26.1 percent of world product. China accounted for more than half 
of this growth and India about a quarter.  
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The 15 Non-G7 industrialized economies generated more than eight 
percent of world output during 1989-2003. These economies were responsible 
for lower shares in world growth than world product before and after 1995. 
Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the 14 economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were larger 
in size than the Non-G7, generating 9.3 percent of world product. All of the 
economies of Eastern Europe experienced a decline in output during 1989-
1995. Collectively, these economies subtracted 26.8 percent from world 
growth during 1989-1995, dragging their share of world product down to 6.6 
percent. During 1989-1995 Russia’s economy was comparable in size to 
Germany’s, but from 1995 to 2003 the Russian economy was only slightly 
larger than the U.K. economy.  
During 1989-1995 the ten percent share of the Latin American economies 
in world growth exceeded their eight-and-a-half percent share in world 
product. After 1995 these economies had a substantially smaller six percent 
share in world growth, while retaining close to an eight-and-a-half share in 
world product with Brazil and Mexico responsible for more than sixty percent 
of this. Brazil’s share in world growth was below its three percent share in 
world product before and after 1995, while Mexico’s growth was lower than 
its product share before 1995 and higher afterward.  
The 11 economies of North Africa and the Middle East, taken together, 
were comparable in size to France, Italy, or the U.K., while the 30 
economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, as a group, ranked with Canada. The 
economies of North Africa and the Middle East had a share in world growth of 
6.3 percent during 1989-1995, well above their 3.6 percent share in world 
product. After 1995 their share in world growth fell to 4.6 percent, still 
above the share in world product of 3.9 percent.  Growth in the economies of 
Sub-Saharan Africa lagged behind their shares in world product during both 
periods.   7
    3. Sources of World Economic Growth.  
We next allocate the sources of world economic growth during 1989-2003  
between the contributions of capital and labor inputs and the growth of 
productivity. We find that productivity, frequently touted as the primary 
engine of economic growth, accounted for only 20-30 percent of world growth. 
Nearly half of this growth can be attributed to the accumulation and 
deployment of capital and another a quarter to a third to the more effective 
use of labor. Our second objective is to explore the determinants of the 
growth of capital and labor inputs, emphasizing the role of investment in 
information technology equipment and software and the importance of 
investment in human capital.  
We have derived estimates of capital input and property income from 
national accounting data for the G7 economies. We have constructed estimates 
of hours worked and labor compensation from labor force surveys for each of 
these economies. We measure the contribution of labor inputs, classified by 
age, sex, educational attainment, and employment status, by weighting the 
growth rate of each type of labor input by its share in the value of output. 
Finally, we employ purchasing power parities for capital and labor inputs 
constructed by Jorgenson (2003).
10 We have extended these estimates of 
capital and labor inputs to the 103 Non-G7 countries using data sources and 
methods described in the Appendix to the electronic version of the paper.
11  
We have distinguished investments in information technology equipment 
and software from investments in other assets for all 110 economies in our 
study. We have derived estimates of IT investment from national accounting 
data for the G7 economies and those of the European Union before 
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enlargement. We measure the contribution of IT investment to economic growth 
by weighting the growth rate of IT capital inputs by the shares of these 
inputs in the value of output. Similarly, the contribution of Non-IT 
investment is a share-weighted growth rate of Non-IT capital inputs. The 
contribution of capital input is the sum of these two components.  
We have revised and updated the U.S. data presented by Jorgenson 
(2001) on investment in information technology and equipment.
12 Data on IT 
investment for Canada have been have been constructed by Statistics 
Canada.
13 Data for the countries of the European Union have been developed 
for the European Commission by van Ark, et al.
14 Finally, data for Japan 
have been assembled by Jorgenson and Motohashi.
15 We have relied on the 
WITSA Digital Planet Report (2002, 2004), as the starting point for 
estimates of IT investment for the remaining economies.
16  
We have divided labor input growth between the growth of hours worked 
and labor quality, where quality is defined as the ratio of labor input to 
hours worked. This reflects changes in the composition of labor input, for 
example, through increases in the education and experience of the labor 
force. The contribution of labor input is the rate of growth of this input, 
weighted by the share of labor in the value of output. Finally, productivity 
growth is the difference between the rate of growth of output and the 
contributions of capital and labor inputs. 
                                                 
12  U.S. data on investment in IT equipment and software, provided by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), are the most comprehensive and detailed. 
The BEA data are described by Bruce Grimm, Brent Moulton, and David 
Wasshausen (2005).  
13See Baldwin and Harchaoui (2003). 
14See van Ark, Melka, Mulder, Timmer, and Ypma (2003, updated 2005).  
15See Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005).  
16WITSA stands for the World Information Technology and Services Alliance. 
Other important sources of data include the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) telecommunications indicators, the UNDP Human Development 
reports, and the Business Software Alliance (2003). Additional details are 
given in the Appendix. 
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The contribution of capital input to world economic growth before 1995 
was 1.18 percent, a little more than 47 percent of the growth rate of 2.50 
percent. Labor input contributed 0.79 percent or slightly less than 32 
percent, while productivity growth of 0.53 percent or just over 21 percent. 
After 1995 the contribution of capital input climbed to 1.56 percent, around 
45 percent of output growth, while the contribution of labor input rose to 
0.89 percent, around 26 percent. Productivity increased to 0.99 percent or 
nearly 29 percent of growth. We arrive at the astonishing conclusion that 
the contributions of capital and labor inputs greatly predominated over 
productivity as sources of world economic growth before and after 1995!  
We have divided the contribution of capital input to world economic 
growth between IT equipment and software and Non-IT capital input. The 
contribution of IT almost doubled after 1995, less than a quarter to more 
than a third of the contribution of capital input. However, Non-IT was more 
important before and after 1995. We have divided the contribution of labor 
input between hours worked and labor quality. Hours rose from 0.39 percent 
before 1995 to 0.62 percent after 1995, while labor quality declined from 
0.40 percent to 0.27 percent. Labor quality and hours worked were almost 
equal in importance before 1995, but hours worked became the major source of 
labor input growth after 1995.  
  The acceleration in the world growth rate after 1995 was 0.95 percent, 
almost a full percentage point. The contribution of capital input explained 
0.38 percent of this increase, while the productivity accounted for 0.46 
percent. Labor input contributed a relatively modest 0.10 percent. The jump 
in IT investment of 0.26 percent was most important source of the increase 
in capital input. This can be traced to the stepped up rate of decline of IT 
prices after 1995 analyzed by Jorgenson (2001). The substantial increase of 
0.23 percent in the contribution of hours worked was the most important 
component of labor input growth.   10
Table 2 presents the contribution of capital input to economic growth 
for the G7 economies, divided between IT and Non-IT. Capital input was the 
most important source of growth before and after 1995. The contribution of 
capital input before 1995 was 1.28 or almost three-fifths of the G7 growth 
rate of 2.18 percent, while the contribution of 1.43 percent after 1995 was 
55 percent of the higher growth rate of 2.56 percent. Labor input growth 
contributed 0.49 percent before 1995 and 0.46 percent afterward, about 22 
percent and 18 percent of growth, respectively. Productivity accounted for 
0.42 percent before 1995 and 0.67 percent after 1995 or less than a fifth 
and slightly more than a quarter of G7 growth, respectively.  
The powerful surge of IT investment in the U.S. after 1995 is mirrored 
in jumps in the growth rates of IT capital through the G7. The contribution 
of IT capital input for the G7 increased from 0.38 during the period 1989-
1995 to 0.69 percent during 1995-2003, rising from 30 percent of the 
contribution of capital input to more than 48 percent. The contribution of 
Non-IT capital input predominated in both periods, but receded slightly from 
0.90 percent before 1995 to 0.74 percent afterward. This reflected more 
rapid substitution of IT capital input for Non-IT capital input in response 
to swiftly declining prices of IT equipment and software after 1995.  
The modest acceleration of 0.38 percent in G7 output growth after 1995 
was powered by investment in IT equipment and software, accounting for 0.31 
percent, while the contribution of Non-IT investment slipped by 0.16 
percent. Before 1995 the contribution of labor quality of 0.42 percent 
accounted for more than eighty percent of the contribution of G7 labor 
input, while the contribution of hours worked of 0.28 percent explained more 
than sixty percent after 1995. The rising contribution of hours worked was 
offset by the declining contribution of labor quality, while productivity 
growth rose by 0.25 percent.    11
In Developing Asia the contribution of capital input increased from 
1.88 percent before 1995 to 2.70 percent after 1995, while the contribution 
of labor input fell from 1.61 percent to 1.19 percent. These opposing trends 
had a slightly positive impact on growth. The significant slowdown in the 
Asian growth rate from 7.35 percent to 5.62 percent can be traced entirely 
to a sharp decline in productivity growth from 3.86 to 1.72 percent. 
Productivity explained slightly over half of Asian growth before 1995, but 
only 30 percent after 1995.  
The first half of the 1990’s was a continuation of the Asian Miracle, 
analyzed by Paul Krugman (1994), Lawrence Lau (1999), and Young (1995). This 
period was dominated by the spectacular rise of China and India and the 
continuing emergence of the Gang of Four – Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. However, all the Asian economies had growth rates 
considerably in excess of the world average of 2.50 percent. The second half 
of the 1990’s was dominated by the Asian financial crisis but, surprisingly, 
conforms much more closely to the “Krugman thesis” attributing Asian growth 
to input growth rather than productivity.  
The “Krugman thesis” was originally propounded to distinguish the 
Asian Miracle from growth in industrialized countries. According to this 
thesis, Asian growth was differentiated by high growth rates and a great 
predominance of inputs over productivity as the sources of high growth. In 
fact, productivity growth exceeded the growth of input during the Asian 
Miracle of the early 1990’s! Moreover, growth in the world economy and the 
G7 economies was dominated by growth of capital and labor inputs before and 
after 1995. Productivity growth played a subordinate role and fell 
considerably short of the contributions of capital and labor inputs to world 
and G7 growth.  
Developing Asia experienced a potent surge in investment in IT 
equipment and software after 1995. The contribution of IT investment more   12
than doubled from 0.15 percent to 0.43 percent, explaining less than eight 
percent of the contribution of capital input before 1995, but almost 16 
percent afterward. The rush in IT investment was particularly powerful in 
China, rising from 0.17 percent before 1995 to 0.63 percent afterward. India 
fell substantially behind China, but outperformed the region as a whole, 
increasing the contribution of IT investment from 0.09 to 0.26 percent.  
Indonesia was the only major economy to experience a decline in the 
contribution of both IT and Non-IT investment after 1995. South Korea’s IT 
investment increased from 0.29 before 1995 to 0.46 percent afterward, while  
Non-IT investment dropped as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis. 
The contribution of Non-IT investment in Asia greatly predominated in both 
periods and also accounted for most of the increase in the contribution of 
capital input after 1995. The contributions of hours worked and labor 
quality declined after 1995 with hours worked dominating in both periods.  
Economic growth in the fifteen Non-G7 industrialized economies 
accelerated much more sharply than G7 growth after 1995. The contribution of 
labor input slightly predominated over capital input before and after 1995. 
The contribution of labor input was 0.81 percent before 1995, accounting for 
about 40 percent of Non-G7 growth, and 1.26 after 1995, explaining 39 
percent of growth. The corresponding contributions of capital input were 
0.75 percent and 1.12 percent, explaining 37 and 34 percent of Non-G7 
growth, respectively. Non-G7 productivity also rose from 0.47 before 1995 to 
0.89 percent afterward; however, productivity accounted for only 23 and 27 
percent of growth in these two periods. 
The impact of investment in IT equipment and software in the Non-G7 
economies doubled after 1995, rising from 0.22 percent to 0.44 percent or 
from 29 percent of the contribution of Non-G7 capital input to 39 percent. 
This provided a substantial impetus to the acceleration in Non-G7 growth of 
1.25 percent. Non-IT investment explained another 0.14 percent of the growth   13
acceleration. However, the increased contribution of hours worked of 0.49 
percent and improved productivity growth of 0.42 percent predominated. 
  The collapse of economic growth in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union before 1995 can be attributed almost entirely to a steep 
decline in productivity during the transition from socialism. This was 
followed by a modest revival in both growth and productivity after 1995, 
bringing many of the transition economies close to levels of output per 
capita that prevailed in 1989. The contribution of capital input declined 
both before and after 1995, even as the contribution of IT investment jumped 
from 0.09 to 0.26 percent. Hour worked also declined in both periods, but 
labor quality improved substantially.  
Latin America’s growth decelerated slightly after 1995, falling from 
2.95 to 2.52 percent. The contribution of labor input was 1.92 percent 
before 1995 and 1.89 percent afterward, accounting for the lion’s share of 
regional growth in both periods. The contribution of capital input rose 
after 1995 from 0.72 percent to 0.99 percent, but remained relatively weak. 
Mexico’s IT investment declined slightly after 1995, while Non-IT investment 
increased. Nonetheless the contribution of IT investment in Latin America 
more than doubled, jumping from 0.15 percent before 1995 to 0.34 percent 
afterward or from 21 percent of the contribution of capital input to 34 
percent. Productivity was essentially flat from 1989 to 2001, rising by 0.31 
percent before 1995 and falling by 0.36 percent after 1995.  
Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa collapsed during 1989-1995 but 
recovered slightly, running at -1.63 percent before 1995 and 0.36 percent 
afterward. The contribution of labor input predominated in both periods, but 
fell from 2.77 percent to 1.89 percent, while the contribution of capital 
input rose from 0.52 percent to 0.99 percent. Productivity in North Africa 
and the Middle East, like that in Latin America, was essentially stationary   14
from 1989-2001, falling from a positive rate of 0.50 percent before 1995 to 
a negative rate of -0.46 percent afterward. 
   4. World Output, Input, and Productivity. 
The final step in our analysis of the world growth resurgence is to 
describe and characterize the levels of output, input, and productivity for 
the world economy, the seven economic regions, and the fourteen major 
economies in Table 3. We present levels of output per capita for 1989, 
before the transition from socialism, 1995, the start of the worldwide IT 
investment boom, and 2003, the end of the period covered by our study. We 
also present input per capita and productivity for the years 1989, 1995, and 
2003, where productivity is defined as the ratio of output to input.  
The G7 economies led the seven economic regions in output per capita, 
input per capita, and productivity throughout the period 1989-2003. Output 
per capita in the G7 was, nonetheless, well below U.S. levels. Taking U.S. 
output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, G7 output per capita was 66.9 in 1989, 
72.8 in 1995 and 85.5 in 2003. For comparison: U.S. output per capita was 
80.6, 86.3, and 106.4 in these years. 
The output gap between the U.S. and the other G7 economies widened 
considerably, especially since 1995. Canada was very close to the U.S. in 
output per capita in 1989, but dropped substantially behind by 1995. The 
U.S.-Canada gap widened further during the last half of the 1990’s. Germany, 
Japan, Italy, and the U.K. had similar levels of output per capita 
throughout 1989-2003, but remained considerably behind North America. France 
lagged the rest of the G7 in output per capita in 1989 and failed to make up 
lost ground.  
The U.S. was the leader among the G7 economies in input per capita 
throughout the period 1989-2003. Taking the U.S. as 100.0 in 2000, G7 input 
per capita was 72.8 in 1989, 77.4 in 1995, and 86.4 in 2003, while U.S. 
input per capita was 84.4, 89.1, and 101.4, respectively. Canada, Germany,   15
and Japan were closest to U.S. levels of input per capita with Canada 
ranking second in 1989 and 2003 and Japan ranking second in 1995. France 
lagged behind the rest of the G7 in input per capita throughout the period 
with Italy and the U.K. only modestly higher.  
Productivity in the G7 has remained close to U.S. levels, rising from 
91.7 in 1989 to 93.9 in 1995 and 96.7 in 2001, with the U.S. equal to 100.0 
in 2000. Canada was the productivity leader throughout 1989-2003 with Italy 
and France close behind. The U.S. occupied fourth place in 1989 and 1995, 
but rose to second in 2003. Japan made substantial gains in productivity, 
but lagged behind the other members of the G7 in productivity, while Germany 
surpassed only Japan.  
Differences among the G7 economies in output per capita can be largely 
explained by differences in input per capita rather than gaps in 
productivity. The range in output was from 64.7 for France to 106.4 for the 
U.S., while the range in input was from 62.1 for France to 101.4 for the 
U.S. Productivity varied more narrowly from 86.7 for Japan to 109.5 for 
Canada with French productivity of 104.2 closely comparable to the U.S.  
In the economies of Developing Asia output per capita rose 
spectacularly from 6.0 in 1989 to 8.5 1995 and 12.1 in 2003 with the U.S. 
equal to 100.0 in 2000. Levels of output per capita in Asia’s largest 
economies, China and India, remained at 13.4 and 8.6, respectively, in 2003. 
These vast shortfalls in output per capita relative to the industrialized 
economies are due mainly to differences in input per capita, rather than 
variations in productivity. Developing Asia’s levels of input per capita 
were 19.1 in 1989, 21.5 in 1995, and 26.2 in 2003, while Asian productivity 
levels were 31.7, 39.7, and 46.1, respectively.  
China made extraordinary gains in output per capita, growing from 4.8 
in 1989 to 8.1 in 1995 and 13.4 in 2003 with the U.S. equal to 100.0 in 
2000. India had essentially the same output per capita as China in 1989, but   16
grew less impressively to levels of only 6.0 in 1995 and 8.6 in 2003. 
China’s input per capita – 17.9 in 1989, 20.7 in 1995, and 28.0 in 2001 - 
exceeded India’s throughout the period. India’s 31.2 productivity level in 
1989 considerably surpassed China’s 26.9. China’s productivity swelled to 
39.3 in 1995, outstripping India’s 35.3. China expanded its lead with a 
productivity level of 48.0 in 2003 by comparison with India’s 43.1.  
Indonesia and South Korea grew impressively from 1989 to 1995, but 
fell victim to the Asian financial crisis during the period 1995-2003.  
Indonesia maintained its lead over India in output per capita, but dropped 
behind China in 2003. Indonesia led both China and India in input per capita 
during 1989-2003. Indonesia’s productivity level led both China and India in 
1995, but fell behind both economies by 2003. South Korea made substantial 
gains in productivity, achieving a level close to Japan in 2003, while 
falling considerably short of Japan’s impressive input per capita. 
  The 15 Non-G7 industrialized economies, taken together, had levels of 
output per capita comparable to Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. during 
1989-2003. Input per capita for the 15 Non-G7 economies was also very close 
to these four G7 economies. However, productivity for the group was 
comparable to that of Germany, the second lowest in the G7.  
  Before the beginning of the transition from socialism in 1989, output 
per capita in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was 34.3, well 
above the world economy level of 18.9, with the U.S. equal to 100.0 in 2000. 
The economic collapse that accompanied the transition reduced output per 
capita to 22.5 by 1995, only modestly higher than the world economy level of 
20.0. A mild recovery between 1995 and 2003 brought the region back to 29.3, 
below the level of 1989, but well above the world economy average of 23.9. 
Input in the region was stagnant at 43.2 in 1989, 41.4 in 1995, and 42.6 in 
2003. Productivity collapsed along with output per capita, declining from 
79.4 in 1989 to 54.4 in 1995, before climbing back to 68.8 in 2003.     17
The downturn in output per capita and productivity was especially 
severe in the economies of the former Soviet Union. Russia’s level of output 
per capita fell from 41.8 in 1989 to 25.1 in 1995 before recovering feebly 
to 33.5 in 2003. Russian input per capita remained essentially unchanged 
throughout the period 1989-2003, while productivity mirrored the decline and 
subsequent recovery in output, falling from a West European level of 83.6 in 
1989 to 52.4 in 1995 before recovering to 70.6 in 2003. We conclude that the 
transition from socialism failed to restore Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union to pre-transition levels of output and input per capita by 
2003, while productivity remained weaker than before the transition.  
  For the Latin American region output per capita rose from 18.6 to 21.0 
during 1989-2003, input per capita rose from 27.1 to 33.0, but productivity 
was essentially unchanged at about two-thirds of the U.S. level in 2000. The 
stall in productivity from 1989 to 2003 was pervasive, contrasting sharply 
with the rise in productivity in the G7 economies, the Non-G7 industrialized 
economies, and Developing Asia. Nonetheless, Latin America’s lagging output 
per capita was due chiefly to insufficient input per capita, rather than a 
shortfall in productivity. 
Brazil’s economic performance has been anemic at best and has acted as 
a drag on the growth of Latin America and the world economy. Despite 
productivity levels comparable to the rest of Latin America, Brazil was 
unable to generate substantial growth in input per capita. Although Mexico 
lost ground in productivity between 1989 and 2003, rising input per capita 
produced gains in output per capita after 1995, despite a slight decline in 
the contribution of IT investment.  
Output and input per capita in Sub-Sahara Africa was the lowest in the 
world throughout the period 1989-2003, but the level of productivity was 
slightly higher than Developing Asia in 1989. All the economies of North 
Africa and the Middle East fell short of world average levels of output and   18
input per capita. Output per capita grew slowly but steadily for the region 
as a whole during 1989-2003, powered by impressive gains in input per 
capita, but with stagnant productivity.  
5. Summary and Conclusions. 
World economic growth, led by the industrialized economies and 
Developing Asia, experienced a strong resurgence after 1995. Developing Asia 
accounted for an astonishing 60 percent of world economic growth before 1995 
and 40 percent afterward, with China alone responsible for half of this, but 
output per capita remained well below the world average. Sub-Saharan Africa 
and North Africa and the Middle East languished far below the world average. 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union lost enormous ground during the 
transition from socialism and have yet to recover completely.   
The growth trends most apparent in the U.S. have counterparts 
throughout the world. Investment in tangible assets, including IT equipment 
and software, was the most important source of growth. However, Non-IT 
investment predominated. The contribution of labor input was next in 
magnitude with labor quality dominant before 1995 and hours worked 
afterward. Finally, productivity was the least important of the three 
sources of growth, except during the Asian Miracle before 1995.  
The leading role of IT investment in the acceleration of growth in the 
G7 economies is especially pronounced in the U.S., where IT is coming to 
dominate the contribution of capital input. The contribution of labor input 
predominated in the Non-G7 industrialized economies, as well as Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle 
East. Productivity growth was the important source of growth in Developing 
Asia before 1995, but assumed a subordinate role after 1995. Productivity 
has been stagnant or declining in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and North Africa and the Middle East.   19
All seven regions of the world economy experienced a surge in 
investment in IT equipment and software after 1995.  The impact of IT 
investment on economic growth has been most striking in the G7 economies. 
The rush in IT investment was especially conspicuous in the U.S., but jumps 
in the contribution of IT capital input in Canada, Japan, and the U.K. were 
only slightly lower. France, Germany, and Italy also experienced a surge in 
IT investment, but lagged considerably behind the leaders. While IT 
investment followed similar patterns in the G7 economies, Non-IT investment 
varied considerably and explains important differences among growth rates.  
Although the surge in investment in IT equipment and software is a 
global phenomenon, the variation in the contribution of this investment has 
increased considerably since 1995. Following the G7, the next most important 
increase was in Developing Asia, led by China. The Non-G7 industrialized 
economies followed Developing Asia. The role of IT investment more than 
doubled after 1995 in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and North Africa and 
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     Appendix 
To measure capital and labor inputs and the sources of economic 
growth, we employ the production possibility frontier model of production 
and the index number methodology for input measurement presented by 
Jorgenson (2001). For the G7 economies we have updated and revised the data 
constructed by Jorgenson (2003). For the remaining 103 economies, we rely on 
two primary sources of data
17: the Penn World Table (2002) and World Bank 
Development Indicators Online (2004) provide national accounting data for 
1950-2003 for all economies in the world except Taiwan. WITSA’s Digital 
Planet Report (2002, 2004) gives data on expenditures on IT equipment and 
software for 70 economies, including the G7.   
U.S. data on investment in IT equipment and software, provided by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) are the most comprehensive.
18 We use these 
data as a benchmark in estimating IT investment data for other economies. 
For the economies included in the Digital Planet Report we estimate IT 
investment from IT expenditures. The Digital Planet Report provides 
expenditure data for computer hardware, software, and telecommunication 
equipment on an annual basis, beginning in 1992.  
Expenditure data from the Digital Planet Report are given in current 
U.S. dollars. However, data are not provided separately for investment and 
intermediate input and for business, household, and government sectors. We 
find that the ratio of BEA investment to WITSA expenditure data for the U.S. 
is fairly constant for the periods 1981-1990 and 1991-2001 for each type of 
IT equipment and software. Further, data on the global market for 
telecommunication equipment for 1991-2001, reported by the International 
                                                 
17 Other important sources of data include the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) telecommunications indicators, and the UNDP 
Human Development reports.  
  
18 The BEA data are described by Grimm, Moulton, and Wasshausen (2004).  
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Telecommunication Union (ITU), confirms that the ratio of investment to 
total expenditure for the U.S. is representative of the global market.  
We take the ratios of IT investment to IT expenditure for the U.S. as 
an estimate of the share of investment to expenditure from the Digital 
Planet Report. We use the penetration rate of IT in each economy to 
extrapolate the investment levels. This extrapolation is based on the 
assumption that the increase in real IT investment is proportional to the 
increase in IT penetration.  
Investment in each type of IT equipment and software is calculated as 
follows:  
Ic, A, t = ηc, A, t*Ec, A, t 
where Ic,A,t, ηc,A,t, and Ec,A,t are investment, the estimated investment-to-
expenditure ratio, and the Digital Planet Report expenditures, respectively, 
for asset A in year t for country c
19.  
Given the estimated IT investment flows, we use the perpetual 
inventory method to estimate IT capital stock. We assume that the geometric 
depreciation rate is 31.5% and the service life is 7 years for computer 
hardware, 31.5% and 5 years for software, and 11% and 11 years for 
telecommunication equipment. Investment in current U.S. dollars for each 
asset is deflated by the U.S. price index to obtain investment in constant 
U.S. dollars.  
To estimate IT investment for the 66 economies not covered by the 
Digital Planet Reports, we extrapolate the levels of IT capital stock per 
capita we have estimated for the 70 economies included in these Reports. We 
                                                 
19 The IT expenditures for years prior to 1992 are projected by means of the 
following model:  
     ln(Eci t-1) = β0 + β1ln(Ec i t) + β2 ln(y i t-1) 
where Eci t represents expenditure on IT asset c  and the subscripts i and t 
indicate country i in year t, and yi t is GDP per capita. The model specifies 
that, for a country i, spending on IT asset c in year t-1 can be projected 
from GDP per capita in that year and spending on asset c in period t.   25
assume that IT capital stock per capita for the 40 additional economies is 
proportional to the level of IT penetration. The details are as follows: 
For computers we divide the 70 economies included in the Digital  
Planet Reports into 10 equal groups, based on the level of personal computer 
(PC) penetration in 2003. We estimate the current value 
i
HW s  of computer 
stock per capita in 2003 for an economy i as:  








HW P P s s = ,  
where 
I
HW s  is the average value of computer capital per capita in 2001 of 
group I for countries included in the Digital Planet Report, 
i
HW P  and 
I
HW P  
are the PC penetration rates of economy i and the average PC penetration of 
group I, respectively.  
For the economies with data on PC penetration for 1995, we use the 
growth rates of PC penetration over 1989-2003 to project the current value 
of computer capital stock per capita backwards. We estimate computer capital 
stock for each year by multiplying capital stock per capita by population. 
For economies lacking the data of PC penetration in 1995 and 1989, we 
estimate computer capital stock by assuming that the growth rates in the two 
periods, 1995-2003 and 1989-1995, are the same as those for the group to 
which it belongs.  
For software capital stock, we divide the 110 countries into 10 
categories by level of PC penetration in 2003. We sub-divide each of these 
categories into three categories by degree of software piracy
20, generating 
30 groups. We assume that the software capital stock-to-hardware capital 
stock ratio is constant in each year for each of the 30 groups: 








SW s s s s =  
                                                 
20 The information on software piracy is based on study conducted by the 
Business Software Alliance (2003).   26
where 
I
SW s  is the average software capital stock per capita of subgroup I in 
2003. Since the value of computer stock per capita has been estimated for 
1995 and 1989, this enables us to estimate the software capital stock per 
capita for these two years. 
Finally, we define the penetration rate for telecommunications 
equipment as the sum of main-line and mobile telephone penetration rates. 
These data are available for all 110 economies in all three years - 1989, 
1995, and 2003.  We have divided these into 10 groups by the level of 
telecommunications equipment penetration for each year. The current value of 
telecommunications capital stock per capita is estimated as:  








TLC P P s s =  
where 
It
TLC s  is the average current of telecommunications equipment capital 
stock per capita in year t of group I for economies included in the Digital 
Planet Reports and 
it
TLC P  and 
It
TLC P  are the telecommunications equipment 
penetration rates of economy i and the average penetration rate of group I 
in year t.  
We employ Gross Fixed Capital Formation for each of the 103 economies 
provided by the Penn World Table, measured in current U.S. dollars, as the 
flow of investment. We use the Penn World Table investment deflators to 
convert these flows into constant U.S. dollars. The constant dollar value of 
capital stock is estimated by the perpetual inventory method for each of the 
103 economies for 1989 and the following years. We assume a depreciation 
rate of 7% and a service life of 30 years.  
The current value of the gross capital stock at a year is the product 
of its constant dollar value and the investment deflator for that year. We 
estimate the current value of Non-ICT capital stock of an economy for each 
year by subtracting the current value of IT stock from the current value of   27
capital stock in that year. Given the estimates of the capital stock for 
each type of asset, we calculate capital input for this stock, using the 
methodology presented of Jorgenson (2001).  
  Finally, labor input is the product of hours worked and labor quality: 
Lt  = Ht * qt 
where Lt, Ht, and qt, respectively, are the labor input, the hours worked, 
and labor quality. A labor quality index requires data on education and 
hours worked for each of category of workers.  
We extrapolate the labor quality indexes for the G7 economies by means 
of the following model: 
qi, t  = β0 + β1 Educationi, t + β2 Institution1i  + β3 Institution2i + β4 
Income1989i + β5T 
where subscripts i and t indicate economy i in year t. Education is the 
educational attainment of the population aged 25 or over from the data set 
constructed by Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (2001). Institution1 = “Rule of 
Law” and Institution2  = “Regulatory Quality” are constructed by Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004) for the World Bank; 
Income1990 is GDP per capita for 1990 from the Penn World Table and T is a 
time dummy.  
Labor quality is largely explained by educational attainment, 
institutional quality and living conditions. The model fits well (R
2 = 
0.973) and all the explanatory variables are statistically significant. We 
assume that hours worked per worker is constant at 2000 hours per year, so 
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